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p c o u n t e ro tr Debating Disability Design: A Response
By Robert E. Rains
There is certainly room for disagreement about our country's legal policies toward persons with dis-
abilities. However, Judge Meisburg's proposals would hardly be the panacea he envisions. While
some of them may merit consideration, others mischaracterize the law, and many are based on





In "Ten Ways to Improve the SSA
Disability Program and Save Billions
of Dollars in the Process," Judge
John M. Meisburg Jr. raises a number
of provocative issues regarding how
a compassionate society should de-
sign its policies toward those with
disabilities. Unfortunately, the judge
does so in a way that sometimes cre-
ates heat rather than light. He also
ignores the fact that many of his pro-
posals have been the subject of re-
cent debates within Congress which
have sometimes resulted in substan-
tive changes to the disability pro-
gram and sometimes have not.
There are two main tensions relat-
ing to disability programs in this
country, which will never be re-
solved to the satisfaction of all. The
first tension involves deciding which
individuals we deem to be too dis-
abled to reasonably believe that they
can engage in substantial gainful em-
ployment and further be worthy of
public income maintenance either
through the Social Security trust fund
or through general revenues, and
which are not. The second tension is
between providing income mainte-
nance and encouraging individuals
with disabilities to work. As one
who has represented many claimants
for more than two decades both in
private practice and while supervis-
ing law students in a disability law
clinic, I am particularly frustrated by
the failure of the government until
now to come up with >-)I,->, 41
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o i n t determine if dlisability is really warranted in a particular
Security Administration (SSA) trust fund or tile treasury
about $250,000 over the life of the claimant, my calcula-
tions reveal that I have potentially approved the expendi-
ture of over $300 million - more than a quarter of a bil-
lion dollars - which is more than the national budget of
the United States in 1890.1 The SSA has about 1,000 ALJs,
and the national approval rate for claims is about 65 per-
cent at the AIJ hearing level. This means billions of dol-
lars per year are being approved for expenditure in the
SSA disability program. The latest estimate is $77 billion
per year! As Sen. Everett Dirksen once said: "A billion
here and a billion there, and sooner or later it adds up to
real money." Reasonable, "tough love" substantive revi-
sions in disabilily law Would save the nation billions of
dollars and should be enacted by tile Congress and the
Social Security Administration. These changes will actually
benefit many claimants by motivating them to return to
work.
In the past, changes proposed in disability law have
been primarily procedural, administrative, and cosmetic.
The changes I propose are mostly substantive and relate
to the eligibility for disability benefits and the rules, regu-
lations, and policies that govern ALJs in the adjudication
of actual cases.
Update the Medical-Vocational Guidelines (so-called "Grid
Rules") to define "Advanced Age" to be 60 and not 55, and
entitled to more liberal treatment; make the Grids adviso-
ry, not mandatory.
At present, under the Grid Rules, if a claimant is 55
years old (called "Advanced Age"), has a limited educa-
tion, an unskilled work background, and is limited to
sedentary work, he or she is deemed to be disabled, and
the ALJ is required to render that decision.2 But, if a per-
son in the age group 55-60 can do sedentary work, he or
she should not be deemed to be disabled. Indeed, this is
a non sequilur - if a person can do sedentary work, he
can work! In our new age of technology and computers, a
person age 55-60 can, with a minimum of training and
skill, perform all sorts of useful work, and should not be
found disabled. The Dictionary of Occupational Titles
contains the listings of numerous jobs that persons age
55-60 can do if they are limited to sedentary work and
have a limited education and unskilled work
background,3 and these jobs exist in significant numbers.
Tie grids could also provide that persons age 50-60
would be "approaching advanced age" and persons Linder
age 50 would be called "younger individuals." This
change in the Grid Rules would dovetail with proposals
to raise the Social Security retirement age to 70, also re-
flecting a trend of modern society that people are living
longer and working longer. The Grid Rules should also be
made advisory and not mandatory - which would give
more flexibility and quasi-judicial discretion to the ALJs to
Deny disability to claimants who fail to follow their doctor's
orders to take medication, lose weight, have surgery, stop
smoking, drinking, or stop using drugs, resulting in self-
induced disability.
Such a rule would greatly encourage personal respon-
sibility and would save billions of dollars annually.
Presently, an SSA regulation provides that claimants must
follow prescribed medical treatment if following said
treatment can restore the claimant to substantial gainful
activity.'" But agency policy statements make it very diffi-
cult for ALJs to enforce this rule by creating a very high
burden of proof as to whether the treatment would "clear-
ly" restore the claimant to substantial gainful employment
(SGA). Social Security Ruling 82-59 (1982). What is need-
ed is a clear-cut statutory mandate.
My experience has been that as much as 50 percent of
all disability is smoking/nicotine related, 75 percent of all
disability claimants are smokers, and many of the smok-
ing claimants smoke 2-3 packs per day (40-60 cigarettes
per day), against the strong advice and urging of their
treating physicians. Most of these claimants are still smok-
ing at the time of the disability hearing. The statute
should provide that ALJs can deny benefits due to tile fail-
Lire of a claimant to follow prescribed treatment, e.g.,
smoking cessation, if medicil evidence in the record, such
as testimony from a medical expert or treating physician,
states that following such treatment would result in a sig-
nificant improvement in the health of the claimant and
enable the claimant to return to SGA. 5 This is especially
true in borderline cases (about 25 percent of all claims)
where a significant improvement in the claimant's health
would clearly "tip the scales" of justice against disability
and in favor of the ability of the claimant to return to
work and SGA.
Congress should also make clear that nicotine addic-
tion is a drug addiction; if nicotine addiction is material to
the claimant's disability, benefits should be denied Linder
the new Drug Addiction and Alcoholism law, 6 as in cases
of alcohol and cocaine addiction. This change would
dovetail with President Clinton's campaign against nico-
tine. 7 Otherwise, many claimants will use their disability
money to fund their nicotine habit, much like their alco-
hol, marijuana, or cocaine habits. The federal government
should not be in tie business of funding bad habits and
lifestyles that cause the disability on which the payments
are based.
Obesity is another serious problem that affects a clear
majority of the disability claimants I have seen and is of-
ten combined with smoking. Frequently, obesity is a med-
ical condition beyond the control of the claimant. But, if
there is no medical reason for the obesity, the claimant
should have the duty to exercise, diet, and lose weight, if
urged to do so by the treating doctor. Failure to do so
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clear and workable rules that would provide meaningful
work incentives (including health insurance) to encour-
age people to leave the disahility rolls.1
It is unfortunate that Judge Meisburg's article is writ-
ten in such a way as to demonize Social Security recipi-
ents. In addition, he draws analogies that are - for
lack of a kinder word - far-fetched. For example, he
tries to eluate the benefits that he has approved for dis-
ablcd persons in the latter half of the 1990s with the na-
tional budget of the United States in 1890. The implied
suggestion, of course, is that 1990s dollars are somehow
the equivalent of 1890s dollars, which obviously defies
history and economic reality.
In order to understand Judge Meisburg's specific sug-
gestions, one must be familiar with the analysis used in
the Social Security regulations to determine whether an
individual is disabled. The Social Security Administration
(SSA) has adopted what is known as the sequential eval-
uation of disability.2 In greatly simplified overview, the
process asks, first, whether the claimant is working (en-
gaging in substantial gainful activity, or SGA). If so, the
evaluation stops and the applicant is ruled not disabled.
If not, the process proceeds to step two: does the
claimant have a severe impairment? If not, the process
stops - the claimant is not disabled. If so, the evalua-
tion moves to step three: does the claimant have a con-
dition which meets the 12-month durational requirement
and meets or equals in severity a listed impairment (a
"listing") as set forth in an appendix to the regulations
divided into fourteen areas or body systems? If so, the
person is disabled. If not, a child claimant is ruled not
disabled, but for an adult claimant there are two more
steps. At step four, the issue is whether the adult
claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform
past relevant work. If so, the adult claimant is not dis-
abled. If not, the process moves on to the fifth and final
step: given residual functional capacity, age, education,
and past work experience, can the claimant perform
other work? SSA has adopted a series of charts, named
the Medical-Vocational Guidelines, but known in the
trade as the grids, to aid in making this final
assessment. 3
Undoubtedly, there are assumptions at every step of
the evaluation which are value-laden both in theory and
in practice. For example, while it might seem obvious at
step one that a person who is currently working is not
disabled, yet it is not uncommon for an older worker
with seriously progressive deteriorating health to contin-
Lie working against medical advice because of the
"Catch 22" step one creates. Such a person, in need of
steady income, cannot "test the waters;" that is, she can-
not continue working and apply for benefits, find out if
she meets the standards, and then quit or retire. She
must quit or retire first, then apply, then wait it out,
sometimes for years. This simply may not be a realistic
option for an ill worker who lives paycheck to pay-
check.
Another judgment is necessarily contained in step
one: how much income demonstrates the ability to
work? Restatcd, how little income will our society let a
person with disabilities attempt to survive on without
public assistance? Through most of the 1990s, this level
was set at $500 per month for most disabled persons.
Effective July 1, 1999, SSA raised this amount to $700
per month "to encourage individuals with disabilities to
attempt to work, and to provide an updated indicator of
when earnings demonstrate the ability to engage in
SGA." 4 This change may also have the effect of more
persons receiving more benefits, at a cost to the govern-
ment, based on policy judgments that few commentators
to the proposed change challenged.
An interesting aspect of the SGA level, arguably
based more on history and politics than reason, is the
continuing and significant discrepancy between the level
of income that blind persons can earn while receiving
income support and the SGA level for all other persons
with disabilities. For 1999, SGA for persons who are
blind is set at $1,110 per month, almost 50 percent
greater than the new SGA level for all other disabled
people and more than 100 percent greater than the gen-
eral SGA level prior to July 1999. On what basis do we
make a societal judgment that blind persons either can
earn so much more money than persons with AIDS,
cancer, etc., while still being disabled, or that all other
disabled people can "get by" on so much less money?
The only response by SSA is that Congress sets the SGA
level for blind persons.5 This obviously begs the ques-
tion of how other disabled people are supposed to sub-
sist at income levels far below that set for blind people.
6
Even step two - the seemingly obvious reqluirement
of a severe impairment - has hardly been free from
controversy. The severity regulation barely survived a
facial challenge in the Supreme Court. 7 While the Court
voted 6-3 to uphold the regulation, Justice Sandra l)ay
O'Connor authored a concurring opinion joined by Jus-
tice John Paul Stevens, addressing "the contention of re-
spondent and various amidc (including 29 states and five
major cities) that this facially valid regulation has been
applied systematically to deny benefits to claimants who
do meet the statutory definition of disability." Justice
O'Connor noted that:
Empirical evidence cited by respondent and the
amici further support the inference that the regula-
tion has been used in a manner inconsistent with
the statutory definition of disability. Before the
step two regulations were promulgated approxi-
mately 8 percent of all claimants were denied ben-
efits at the "not severe" stage of the administrative
>'>-> 43
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should be treated like other failures to follow prescribed
treatment. SSA recently abolished the listing for obesity,
which had previously automatically granted disability to
persons who were morbidly obese according to a height
and weight chart. This was prompted by a congressional
outcry from a spoof on the TV show "The Simpsons"
which portrayed Homer Simpson deciding to eat himself
into disability payments by eating all the pies and cakes
he could find so he would not have to work. Prior to this
change, America was probably the only nation in the
world that paid its citizens to be overweight. Obesity is
now recognized as a serious national health problem that
affects more than 50 percent of the American people ac-
cording to American Medical Association standards, and
often is the result of our self-indulgent, sedentary culture
and lifestyle.
Abolish disability for children.
The concept of disability for children is a non sequitur
because children do not work in the first instance. More-
over, this program is known to be ripe for waste and
fraud because the parents who are given the benefits may
spend the payments on other things such as beer and cig-
arettes rather than on medical care for their children. In-
stead, Congress should ensure that poor cbildren are pro-
vided with free medical care under Medicare or some oth-
er program (perhaps called "Kiddicare"). This change
alone would probably save hundreds of millions of dol-
lars per year from the trust fund and treasury.
parents to act unruly secondary to financial gain motiva-
tion. Such a process also teaches children to lie and to
fabricate a medical condition in order to obtain govern-
ment benefits - a terrible lesson for young people to
learn. America is probably the only nation in the world
that has rewarded bad behavior in children with disability
payments for such new psychological disorders as Atten-
tion Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) and Opposi-
tional Defiant Disorder (ODD). Numerous medical journal
articles have recently spoken to the epidemic of misdiag-
nosis of ADHD and the overuse of the drug Ritalin on the
children of America. Recently, the Listing for ADHD was
abolished, partly as a result of the abuses mentioned
above. There was a realization, I believe, that this disease
alone should not justify disability payments. Branding a
child as "disabled" can also have a deleterious psycholog-
ical impact on the child who then sees himself, perhaps
forever, as a misfit, which becomes a "self-fulfilling proph-
esy." While I certainly believe that ADHD and ODD are
real mental impairments, I also believe that the answer in
many borderline cases is not medical treatment and med-
ication and disability payments, but love and discipline.
Isn't it strange that such problems with children hardly
existed in the 1950s when biblical values of the sanctity of
marriage (not divorce), extended families, submission to
authority, proper care for and discipline of children, re-
spect for parental and teacher authority, and the Ten
Commandments were held sacrosanct?
Abolish disability for persons who cannot speak English.
Under current regulations, an ALJ must consider a
claimant's inability to speak English as one disabling fac-
America is probably the only nation in the world
that has rewarded bad behavior in children with
disability payments for such new psychological
disorders as Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder
(ADHD) and Oppositional Defiant Disorder (ODD).
Moreover, disability has often been awarded to chil-
dren who are simply disobedient and unruly and need
parental and school love and discipline, not federal mon-
ey. In some cases, the consultative examinations reveal
that the claimant/child is actually being coached by the
tor (i.e., the inability to properly communicate). 8 Under
this regulation, more than half of the city of Miami and
much of the state of California could potentially be found
to be disabled! As a former resident of Miami, I know that
*)P> 44
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process; afterwards approximately 40 percent of all
claims were denied at this stage.
She concluded that, in her view, "step two may not be
used to disqualify those who meet the statutory defini-
tion of disability."8 This two-justice concurrence, cou-
pled with the three-justice dissent, sent a strong mes-
sage to SSA to reconsider how it was evaluating whether
claimants have a severe impairment.
Another value judgment implicit in the severity step is
whether SSA should consider or ignore an individual's
impairments, each of which in isolation is nonsevere,
but in combination severely restrict the ability to work.
Prior to 1984, SSA adopted the policy of ignoring such
impairments. That policy was invalidated by various
court decisions and ultimately by Congress in the Social
Security Benefits Reform Act of 1984.9
Step three - the listings - is based on a presump-
tion that a person with the listed condition at the listing
level of severity cannot be expected to work. But that
same person, if working, would normally have been dis-
qualified at step one. In the government's brief to the
Supreme Court in a significant disability case last term,
co-authored by SSA's general counsel, this point was ex-
pressly acknowledged:
Because of the use by the SSA of generalized pre-
sumptions, a finding that a person is disabled for
purposes of Social Security benefits does not mean
that there is no job that he can perform. For exam-
ple, at step three of the Social Security determina-
tion process, an individual with an impairment list-
ed in the regulations (such as blindness) is conclu-
sively presumed to be "disabled" and "unable to
work" without any inquiry into his ability to do his
past work or other work that exists in the national
economy (and even though many people with that
impairment may in fact be working). 0
Step 4 - the ability to return to past relevant work
- likewise contains policy judgments both in theory
and practice. SSA defines past relevant work "usually" as
work the individual performed within the past 15
years. 11 But it is common sense that some jobs - and
particularly the more skilled jobs - evolve much faster
than others. Moreover, in practicality, the major guide
that SSA has been using to assess jobs, the Department
of Labor's Dictionary of Occupational Titles is hopeless-
ly out of date, with large numbers of entries not updat-
ed in 20 years. Although a new vocational guide, the
"O*NET" is being developed by the Department of Labor
to replace the Dictionary of Occupational Titles, it is far
from complete and usable at this point; and despite ear-
ly enthusiasm by SSA, it is unclear whether SSA will be
Step 5 - the ability to engage in other work - also
involves policy judgments as to which reasonable minds
might differ. The regulations explicitly provided that:
(a) It does not matter whether -
(1) Work exists in the immediate area in which you
live;
(2) A specific job vacancy exists for you; or
(3) You would be hired if you applied for work.
(c) Inability to obtain work. We will determine that you
are not disabled if your residual functional capacity
and vocational abilities make it possible for you to
do work which exists in the national economy, but
you remain unemployed because of-
(1) Your inability to get work ...
(3) Tile hiring practices of employers;
(4) Technological changes in the industry in which
you have worked;
(6) No job openings for you;
(7) You would not actually be hired to do work
you could otherwise do; or ...12
Does it make sound policy to say to such a person, in
effect, "you can work?"
Turning to Judge Meisburg's specific suggestions, sev-
eral may be worthy of debate, and, although not noted
by Judge Meisburg, some have been recently debated
and indeed acted upon by the United States Congress or
SSA itself.
Update the Medical-Vocational Guidelines (so-called
"Grid Rules") to define "Advanced Age" to be 60 and
not 55, and entitled to more liberal treatment;
make the Grids advisory, not mandatory.
It may be true, as Judge Meisburg believes, that a
particular individual age 55-59 with limited education,
and an unskilled work background who is limited to
sedentary work, can perform all sorts of useful work.
Certainly some do. On the other hand, as should now
be clear, tile entire structure of the Social Security regu-
lations is premised on making generalizations about in-
dividuals. These generalizations reflect, to the best of
the administration's judgment, that it is not reasonable
to believe that most individuals in the situations de-
scribed would be able with reasonable effort to engage
in substantial gainful activity. [Also, although the admin-
istration does not like to say so, the regulations also re-
flect, to some extent, hiring realities.]
Judge Meisburg suggests that the Diclionary of Occu-
pational Titles contains listings of numerous jobs that
persons age 55-60 can do if they are limited to seden-
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the inability to speak English has little or no effect on
workers in that city. More than half of the city speaks
Spanish, and it is often the "Anglos" who only speak Eng-
lish who are at a disadvantage. The inability to speak
Spanisb (not English) is often a very "disabling" factor in
this city, especially in areas such as Little Havana. Persons
who only speak Spanish have little or no trouble earning
a living in this city because they work in Spanish speak-
ing areas and businesses. Persons who come to America
have the obligation to learn the native language of Eng-
lish; we should not discourage them by paying disability
benefits to those who fail to learn the language. This
change would dovetail with the recent vote in California
to abolish bilingual education as a failed policy that pre-
vents children from learning English and being able to
function in an English-speaking nation. Even more anom-
alous is that this regulation also applies in Puerto Rico,
where residents can apply for disability benefits based in
part on their inability to speak English, despite tile fact
that the island is mostly Spanish-speaking.
Prohibit "Re-opening" of old claims; limit Title II "back
benefits" to one year prior to the application date.
At present, "back benefits" are not permitted in Title
XVI/Supplemental Security Income claims, but are al-
lowed in Title Il/insurance claims, dating back to the al-
leged onset date, which could be as much as 10 years pri-
or to the application date. Reopening of old claims is also
allowed (on "good cause") if the new claim is within two
years of the initial denial of a prior Title XVI/SSI claim,
and within four years of the initial denial of a prior Title
II/insurance claim. Thus, it is possible for a claimant to
seek reopening of an old claim that was filed four years
earlier, with an alleged onset date of 10 years in the dis-
tant past. This creates a very difficult inquiry for the ALJ
who must sift through medical records that are 10 years
old and must question the claimant about his condition a
decade in the past. Many claimants cannot remember
what they did last week, much less 10 years ago. In my
view, this procedure is unrealistic and unworkable. I pro-
pose that "reopening" of old claims denied in the past not
be permitted (since the claimant failed to .ppeal the de-
nial to an ALJ) and that Title II back benefits be limited to
one year prior to the application date regardless of the al-
leged onset date. The ban on all back benefits in Title
XVI/SSI claims should remain. These changes would save
hundreds of millions if not billions of dollars, and would
make disability hearings infinitely more straightforward
and practical.
Create "Temporary Total Disability" and give the ALJs Con-
tinuing Disability Review (CDR) continuing jurisdiction.
At present, when claimants are put on the disability
rolls, thev often stay there forever, regardless of whether
their medical condition improves or their disability ceases.
This is so because "temporary total disability" does not
exist under SSA law (as in workers' compensation law),
only "permanent, total disability." In other words, it is all
or nothing. Once a claimant is pronounced "disabled," the
benefits last forever unless a "continuing disability review"
is conducted, which is supposed to take place within
three years of all cases decided but often does not occur
due to a lack of resources.
Continuing disability reviews are extremely cost-effec-
tive and critical for the quality assurance of the disability
program and to prevent waste and fraud. Congress has of-
ten urged the SSA to make continuing disability reviews a
top priority and has appropriated millions for this pur-
pose, often to no avail.
One alternative would be to give ALJs "continuing ju-
risdiction" in cases where the ALJ determines that medical
improvement is likely, much like U.S. district judges have
"continuing jurisdiction" over issues in litigated cases
(such as the remedy stage, which continues for many
years and needs court supervision, e.g., school busing to
achieve racial integration). Where the case for disability is
borderline and medical improvement due to planned sur-
gery, physical therapy, or rehabilitation is likely, or tbe
ALJ has directed the claimant to vocational rehabilitation,
it is quite possible that the claimant can return to the
workforce. In such cases, AIJs could have tile authority to
order claimants to submit proof within one or two years
that they are still disabled, and the ALJs who find disabili-
ty could hold the CDR hearings due to their familiarity
with the facts.
Prohibit "reapplication" for disability based on the same
impairments within one year of an unfavorable ALJ deci-
sion.
At present, claimants can file a new claim based on tile
same impairments one day after an unfavorable ALJ or
Appeals Council decision; this is irrational because it has
just been adjudicated that they are not disabled. The 12-
month durational requirement states a claimant must be
disabled for 12 months, or expect to be so, to obtain ben-
efits. The change would be a modification of this rule.
The rule could also provide that if the medical condition
worsens during tile 12-month period, a new claim could
be filed if the claimant obtains a statement from his or her
physician stating that the condition had worsened during
that period.
Close the evidentiary record after the AlJ decision; require
the Appeals Council to abide by and use federal court
precedent in their decision making.
At present, claimants can submit new medical evidence
on appeal to the Appeals Council if it is "new and materi-
al." This is not allowed in federal court or in any other ju-
dicial system. The Appeals Council review should not be
a de novo review, like the ALJ hearing, but should be
)")')- 46
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tary work and have a limited education and unskilled
work background. But for obvious reasons, the Dictio-
nary of Occupational Titles does not consider the age of
an employee or applicant for employment. Judge Meis-
burg asserts that it is a non sequitur for the regulations
to provide that someone who can perform sedentary
work is disabled, and, on its face, there is some force to
that remark. On the other hand, what is the reasonable
likelihood that a person aged 55-59, with a severe im-
pairment or combination of impairments, who cannot
lift more than 10 pounds at a time, nor frequently lift 10
pounds, nor engage in significant standing or walking
during an eight-hour day, 13 who has less than a high
school education, and either has not worked during the
last 15 years or lacks the capacity to return to any job
he has held in the last 15 years, would be considered a
reasonable candidate for employment? How many em-
ployers would seriously consider hiring such an individ-
ual (notwithstanding the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act)?14 I submit that, in the main, such individuals
do not have much by way of realistic job prospects.
If it could be demonstrated that in the real world
such persons would not face enormous difficulties in
obtaining (and keeping) employment, then the general-
ization currently in the Grid Rules may be unfounded.
Judge Meisburg points to no such data or study and,
frankly, it seems doubtful that many employers, with or
without the blessings of their insurance carriers, would
want to hire such individuals. Finally, notwithstanding
SSA's stated policy that it doesn't matter if any individual
is hireable, is it good public policy to deny such persons
subsistence income?
Deny disability to claimants who fail to follow their
doctor's orders to take medication, lose weight,
have surgery, stop smoking, drinking, or stop using
drugs, resulting in self-induced disability.
Medication and Surgery. As Judge Meisburg con-
cedes, SSA regulations already provide that claimants
must follow prescribed treatment.1 5 He argues, however,
that Social Security Ruling (SSR) 82-59 makes it too diffi-
cult to deny benefits to claimants who fail to follow pre-
scribed treatment by requiring that the treatment would
clearly restore the claimant to the ability to engage in
substantial gainful activity. He fails to add that this rul-
ing goes on to state that if "the treating source states
that prescribed treatment will restore the ability to work,
consideration should be given to that opinion." Surely
the prescribing physician is in a better position to assess
the possible beneficial effects of a treatment he has pre-
scribed than even the smartest ALJ.
Obesity. This appears to be a moot issue. On Aug. 24,
1999, SSA eliminated the obesity listing.' 6 In both the
Notice of Proposed Rule Making 1 7 and final Rule Mak-
ing, SSA referred to unidentified "current medical and
vocational research" in support of this change. In re-
sponse to a FOIA request to identify the medical litera-
ture search that led to the proposal to delete the obesity
listing, SSA replied:
We do not have any documents to provide. Our lit-
erature search was done by a medical consultant
and the medical librarian of the now-defunct of-
fice of Medical Evaluation's medical library. The
purpose of the search was to determine whether
there existed any current medical research findings
that would indicate a correlation between obesity
per se (as opposed to obesity in combination with
various other impairments associated with obesity)
and loss of function. The search for articles was
conducted via computer (e.g., Medline). Foreign
language articles and some articles in obscure jour-
nals were not obtained.
We found no information linking obesity directly
to loss of function. Obesity was cited as a risk fac-
tor for mortality and associated with other impair-
ments, primarily cardiovascular and musculoskele-
tal impairments, although there were other types
of impairments too. As you know, our policy has
long recognized this connection and would contin-
ue to recognize it if we promulgate the proposed
rules. Since there was no specific information
found on the topic, we did not prepare a written
report of our findings. We no longer have copies
of the articles we retrieved or records of those arti-
cles. 1
8
With the unwillingness of SSA to identify the sources
underlying this change, it is impossible to determine
whether they are any more scientific or reliable than the
source cited by Judge Meisburg, "Tile Simpsons."
Both advocates and SSA might ponder whether, un-
der these circumstances, SSA has met the standard enun-
ciated by the Supreme Court that, "an agency changing
its course by rescinding a rule is obligated to supply a
reasoned analysis beyond that which may be required
when an agency does not act in the first place."'
9
Smoking, drinking, using drugs. By virtue of two
congressional enactments in tile 1990s, persons disabled
by current use of drugs or alcohol are denied benefits.
20
Judge Meisburg is certainly correct that our policies in
this country toward tobacco are inconsistent. If his pro-
posal to deny benefits where tobacco use is "material"
to disability is intended to be consistent with the current
drug and alcohol abuse policy, it may well merit consid-
eration. Materiality in this context would mean that ben-
efits would be denied only if the person would not be
disabled in the near future if he abandoned his habit.
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based upon the evidence in tile record. If the ALJ decision
is supported by "substantial evidence" and conforms to
the law and the regulations, it should be affirmed. If new
and material evidence affecting the claim becomes avail-
able after the decision, tile claimant should be required to
ask the ALJ to reopen the case for a new hearing, or file a
new claim, with a request to reopen the prior claim based
on new evidence.
At present, the Appeals Council does not utilize federal
court case law precedent in its decision making, while
ALJs do this routinely. The Appeals Council should be re-
quired to do so.
This relates to the policy of the agency to not "acqui-
esce" to federal court decisions with which they disagree,
which is now the subject of congressional hearings and
proposed legislation requiring SSA to abide by federal
court precedent in tile judicial circuit where the decision
is rendered. 9 There have been proposals to abolish the
Appeals Council, but this might put an undue burden on
the federal courts (which could be remedied by hiring
more federal magistrates or creating one federal appellate
court for disability appeals). It is an anomaly that we have
the only system of justice wherein lower-graded Appeals
Council judges who often do not have trial experience
and do not use federal court precedent in their decision
making can overrule the decisions of higher graded ALJs
with extensive trial experience. One solution would be to
make Appeals Council judges ALJs chosen from the Office
of Personnel Management register.
Give SSA AL's the power to issue and enforce orders, sub-
poenas and contempt citations.
At present, SSA ALJs have little real power to control
the proceedings before them. Unlike state and federal
judges (who often decide cases that involve claims worth
much less from a monetary viewpoint) SSA ALJs have no
contempt power, no real authority to enforce subpoenas,
and even no real authority to issue orders related to the
cases they are adjudicating. I was informed recently that
an SSA ALJ had no authority to issue an order requiring
an attorney to submit a post-hearing brief discussing cer-
tain key issues of fact and law relating to his client's case,
although ALJs in other agencies issue such orders routine-
ly. The Social Security Act (§ 423 (d)(5)(A)) provides that
"an individual shall not be considered to be tinder a dis-
ability unless he furnishes such medical and other evi-
dence of the existence thereof as the Commissioner or So-
cial Security may require." I propose that the SSA adopt
regulations pursuant to this statutory provision which
gives ALJs the authority to issue orders requiring the pro-
duction of evidence, and to issue orders requiring a
claimant's representative to file a brief or position state-
ment on factual and legal issues in the case if the ALJ
deems this to be appropriate or helpful to the adjudica-
tion. This seems elementary. The proposed regulation
could also give the ALJ the authority to issue contempt ci-
tations and enforce subpoenas by the use of civil fines.
ALJs should also be given the authority to reduce fees of
representatives who disobey orders or who are found in
contempt. These changes would produce a more efficient
and productive adjudication process that would help to
ensure that only truly meritorious claims are paid.
Make the Office of Hearings and Appeals (OHA) an inde-
pendent agency of the federal government, much like the
Office of Special Counsel is independent of the Merit Sys-
tems Protection Board.
This move would underline the independence of OHA
from SSA and ensure tile independence of OHA ALJs in
their decision making. During the Reagan years, there was
pressure on ALJs to deny disability claims. Now, under
President Clinton, ALJs complain about pressure to grant
claims. ALJs should be tinder no political pressure one
way or the other, but should be totally independent in
their decision making and in the manner in which they
develop the evidence in a particular case. OIA could still
receive policy updates and rulings from SSA, as well as
other regulatory information, but could be run as a sepa-
rate, independent agency. This would be a step toward
an independent ALJ corps which has been proposed in
Congress for several years. ALJs should not be employed
by the agency for which they are deciding cases - this is
an inherent conflict of interest.
There is no doubt that millions of Americans are truly
disabled due to accidents, chronic pain and other dis-
abling conditions. For those who are truly suffering, we
should make tile process as painless and as efficient as
possible, especially since most claimants have paid into
the Title II insurance system during their working years
and are entitled to disability payments if they truly are Lin-
able to work. ALJs are now correctly paying about 65 per-
cent of all claims. But there are also millions of "border-
line" cases that should be scrutinized very closely: this is
the mission of the ALJ. Today, so many people are on dis-
ability that a shortage of workers actually exists in sonic
areas of the country. Moreover, it is a known fact that
work is very therapeutic, and may be "just what the doc-
tor ordered," for those suffering from borderline physical
or mental conditions that heal over time. But, it is a "no-
brainer" that a person who "gives up" and sits at home,
watching TV, gaining weight, smoking 60 cigarettes per
day, drinking a case a beer every clay, smoking marijuana
and using other illegal drugs, is likely to get worse rather
than better and may always be disabled and a ward of the
state. Activity and work are often far better physically and
mentally than disability payments. To take an extreme
case to prove a point, a claimant who can smoke 60 ciga-
rettes per day and drink 24 beers per day has excellent
concentration, hand-eye coordination, and manual dexter-
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Abolish disability for children.
Of course, we all wish we could abolish disability for
children. Nevertheless, there are many children with se-
rious disabilities in this country even though, as Judge
Meisburg notes, we do not normally expect children to
work in the sense of full-time employment. Although
not noted by Judge Meisburg, the wisdom of retaining
cash benefits for disabled children in poor families was
fully debated by Congress during the legislative process
fied few cases of suspected coaching and very few of
the children involved received SSI benefits." 23 If there
are, in fact, isolated cases of "coaching," it is appropriate
to deny benefits and possibly even seek - in extreme
cases - criminal sanctions. But the fact that a few peo-
ple may try to "work the system," is no more a basis to
eliminate this program than it would be to eliminate fed-
eral income taxes.
Abolish disability for persons who cannot speak
English.
Judge Meisburg asserts that the effect of considering
the inability of a claimant to speak English means that
But the fact that a few people may try to "work the
system, is no more a basis to eliminate this program
than it would be to eliminate federal income taxes.
leading to enactment of the Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (more
commonly known as the Welfare Reform Act.)
2 1
If Judge Meisburg's proposed "Kiddicare" program
would really cover all additional costs incurred by an in-
digent family trying to do a good job of raising a child
with significant disabilities, and if such a program could
be administered without great expense by appropriate
governmental units, then it would certainly deserve con-
sideration. One would assume, of course, that it would
include the cost of tutoring, making a home wheelchair-
accessible, purchasing a wheelchair-accessible van,
transportation to such things as therapy sessions and
medical visits, reimbursement for work opportunities the
parent(s) had to forgo to care for the child, etc. 22 The
point is that many of the costs in such situations hardly
fall into what is traditionally covered by public or pri-
vate medical insurance plans.
It is unfortunate that Judge Meisburg has revived the
seemingly dead issue of parents coaching children to
misbehave so they can get Supplemental Security In-
come (SSI) benefits. As part of the legislative process for
the Welfare Reform Act of 1996, the House of Represen-
tatives requested the General Accounting Office to study
this repeated allegation. The GAO, reviewing SSA's own
efforts to determine whether this problem is real and
significant, concluded, "Both of these initiatives identi-
"more than half the city of Miami and much of the state
of California could potentially be found to be disabled!"
It may be, as Judge Meisburg suggests, that more than
half the population of Miami and much of tile popula-
tion of California are "illiterate or unable to communi-
cate in English,"2 4 but frankly I doubt it, and Judge
Meisburg cites no authority (not even "The Simpsons")
for this novel proposition. Even if true, it would hardly
equate to half of those populations receiving disability
benefits for the simple reason that such an inability to
communicate in English only becomes a vocational fac-
tor at step 5. Thus, it is only relevant to disabled per-
sons who have already been found to be not working,
severely impaired and unable to return to any work they
have performed in the past 15 years. Unless large parts
of the population of Miami and California (and Puerto
Rico) are so afflicted, something is wrong with Judge
Meisburg's math.
Carping aside, this may be a situation, at least in
some parts of the country, where, occasionally, voca-
tional expert testimony will be at variance with tile re-
sult mandated by the Medical Vocational Guidelines (the
grids). If, in an individual case, it could be demonstrated
through valid testimony that the occupational base was
not significantly eroded for a claimant, then that might
result in vocational testimony trumping the grids.
25 I
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ity and can almost certainly do some type of unskilled
work!
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)
and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) were
passed by Congress in 1968 to prevent discrimination
against older workers and job applicants, assist disabled
persons to return to work, and make employers sensitive
to disabilities and accommodate special needs. The feder-
al government should strive to fully enforce these laws,
and SSA disability law should not work at cross purposes
with the ADEA and the ADA.10 SSA disability should pay
only those persons clearly unable to work, and should en-
courage as many claimants as possible to return to work
when able, utilizing disability payments for support in the
interim period of rest, recuperation, treatment, and reha-
bilitation.
President Dwight D. Eisenhower warned the nation in
1956 about the staggering potential costs of a federal dis-
ability program, and the tendency of such a program to
make citizens overly dependent upon federal benefits, de-
stroying their will and incentive to return to the workforce
as productive citizens. As baby boomers reach age 50 and
a new wave of disability claims approaches, the changes
proposed here will go a long way toward addressing Pres-
ident Eisenhower's two concerns. TFL
Judge Meisburg is U.S. administrative law judge assigned
to the Office of Hearings and Ap-
peals, Social Security Administration,
Jacksonville, Fla. He has seived as an
ALJ with OHA for six yeais, and has
28 years of federal legal service in
seven agencies: OHA (Louisville and
Jacksonville); Equal Employment Op-
portuni , Commission (Atlanta and
Miaini); Department of Justice
(Washington, D.C); U.S. District
Court/Louisville, Ky.; U.S. House of
Representatives (Washington, D.C.); Qffice of Speci
CounselMSPB (Washington, D.C.); and Federal Deposit
Insurance Coiporation (Orlando, Fla).
Endnotes
17he World Almanac and Book of Facts, 1999.
2This Grid Rule is found at 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart
P, Appendix 2, Rule 201.01.
3Such jobs include (1) electronic surveillance systems
monitor, Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT)
#379.367-010, Unskilled/sedentary, 131,000 jobs in the na-
tional economy; (2) Information Clerk, DOT #237.367-022,
unskilled/sedentary, 6,569 jobs in national economy; (3)
Stuffer/toys, DOT #731-685-014, Unskilled/Sedentary,
297,582 jobs in national economy, (4) Tube Operator,
DOT #239.687-014, Unskilled/sedentary, 18,898 jobs in na-
tional economy.
'1This regulation is found at 20 CFR 404.1530 (Title II
claims) and 416.930 (Title 16/SSl claims).
5See Hon. John M. Meisburg Jr., Smoking, Disabilit,
and Saving Ameica fr'om Bankrttptcy, Till.i FEDEAL LAWYE.R
(March/April 1998).
642 U.S.C. 423 (d)(2)(c) and 1382c (a)(3)(j) (Contract
with America Advancement Act, 1996).
7SSA apparently has recently adopted this view, accord-
ing to statements made in the recent DA&A training given
all ALJs nationwide; but no formal policy guidance has
been issued.
8This regulation is found at 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P,
Appendix 2.
9The Federal Agency Compliance Bill (H.R. 1924) has
been assigned to the House Judiciary Subcommittee on
Commercial and Administrative Law; this bill Would re-
quire all federal agencies to abide by the federal court de-
cisions at least in the judicial circuits in which the deci-
sions are rendered.
10See Matthew Diller, Dissonant Disability Policies: he
7ension between the ADA and the Federal Disability Bene-
fit Program, 76 TEXAS L\v REVIEw 5 (April 1998).
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doubt, however, that in drafting rules for a national pro-
gram, SSA will or should conclude that unemployed per-
sons with severe impairments who cannot return to past
relevant work are not also, in the main, vocationally dis-
advantaged by an inability to communicate in English.
Prohibit "Re-opening" of old claims; limit
Title II "back benefits" to one year prior to the
Application date.
Reopening. Currently there are strict time limits and
conditions on reopening claims, except for extreme cir-
cumstances such as later-acquired evidence that a wage-
earner was, in fact, dead.2 6 Reopening is only allowed
after 12 months for "good cause" which is principally
based on "new and material evidence" being furnished.
In my practice experience over two decades, this typi-
cally arises in situations where mentally ill or mentally
retarded persons previously filed claims asserting only
physical disabilities. They were either unaware or
ashamed of their mental disabilities, or simply did not
understand the vocational relevance of those disabilities.
Thus, for example, my client who had abandoned a
claim for disability based on having "arthritis in every
joint of his body" never bothered to inform SSA of his
ongoing schizophrenia and his years as an inpatient in
mental hospitals. Yes, SSA could have saved money by
refusing to open his prior claim and that refusal would
not have been reviewable by a court, 27 but surely it was
appropriate not to financially punish such a person for
the effects of the very disease process which in fact ren-
dered him totally disabled.
Limit Title II "Back Benefits" to one year prior to the
application date. Judge Meisburg is simply mistaken in
his belief that "'back benefits' ... are allowed in Title II
insurance claims, dating back to the alleged onset date,
which could be as much as 10 years prior to the appli-
cation date." This assertion is incorrect in two ways.
First, Title II benefits never date back to the alleged on-
set date. Rather, "benefits do not begin until you have
been disabled for a full five months."28 Second, it is im-
possible for benefits to date back 10 years prior to the
claimant's initial application. This is because the five
month "waiting period can begin no earlier than the
17th month before the month you apply - no matter
how long you were disabled before then."2 9 Inasmuch
as 17-5=12, Title II back benefits already are limited to
12 months (1 year) prior to initial application. In other
words, Judge Meisburg's proposal merely restates the
current law and thus could hardly "save hundreds of
millions if not billions of dollars."
Create "Temporary Total Disability" and give the
AlJs Continuing Disability Review (CDR) continuing
jurisdiction.
Why? A continuing disability review will, in effect,
lead to a new initial determination. That is not what
ALJs do; it is the province of the state agencies. An ALJ
can already note in a favorable decision that a case
should be "diaried" for an early CDR. The CDR should
then be performed by the state agency which has in
place the machinery for obtaining updated records.
Would, under Judge Meisburg's proposal, the Office of
Hearings and Appeals undertake to contact all treatment
sources and obtain such records? What would that do to
the efficiency of OHA? And should recipients, in the first
instance, be forced to a hearing - and often attorneys'
fees - for a first level CDR?
Prohibit "reapplication" for disability based on the
same impairments within one year of an unfavor-
able ALJ decision.
Is this change meant for administrative efficiency and
economy at the expense of denying legitimate claims?
Would Judge Meisburg impose such a limitation even in
the case of an intervening event involving the same im-
pairment such as a second heart attack? He proposes an
exception "if the claimant obtains a statement from his
or her physician stating that the condition had wors-
ened. ..." Given that most claimants are older individu-
als, often with progressive conditions involving the mus-
culo-skeletal, cardiovascular, or other major systems, I
suspect that this (humane) exception would eventually
swallow the new rule.
Close the evidentiary record after the AIJ decision;
require the Appeals Council to abide by and use
federal court precedent in their decision making.
Closing the record after the ALJ decision. Especially
where, as frequently happens, a claimant was unrepre-
sented before the ALJ, it makes perfect sense to allow
such new and material evidence if SSA's primary goal is
truth-seeking rather than administrative efficiency. In-
stead, Judge Meisburg recommends that "the claimant
sheald be required to ask the ALJ to reopen the case for
a new hearing, or a new claim filed, with a request to
reopen the prior claim based on new evidence." The
first alternative is an interesting one, which would re-
quire regulatory clarification with regard to such matters
as time limitations, justification for prior failure to sub-
mit, etc. Judge Meisburg's second alternative - a new
claim filed with a request to reopen the prior claim -
flatly contradicts his earlier proposal to "Prohibit 're-
opening' of old claims." It is difficult to see how both
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proposals could be effected.
Require the Appeals Council to Abide by Federal Court
Precedent. In more than 20 years of representing Social
Security claimants, I have not known ALJs to "utilize
federal court caselaw precedent in their decisionmaking
... routinely." Such practice would appear to contravene
both SSA regulations 30 and a 1997 directive from SSA's
general counsel to all ALJs that they are "bound to fol-
low agency policy even if, in the ALJ's opinion, the poli-
cy is contrary to law."3 1
Nevertheless I wholeheartedly agree with Judge Meis-
burg and many ALJs, federal judges, and other commen-
tators, that SSA's current policy of acquiescence/non-ac-
quiescence, is simply wrong. It constitutes an insult to
both administrative law judges and administrative ap-
peals judges, and a disservice to deserving claimants
and reviewing courts.
Give SSA ALJs the power to issue and enforce orders,
subpoenas and contempt citations.
The frustration of some ALJs with some representa-
tives (and vice versa) is certainly understandable. How-
ever, this is an area which, although not mentioned by
Judge Meisburg, has been the subject of recent review
and action by SSA. In August 1998, the agency adopted
new Standards of Conduct for Claimant Representatives.
32 SSA considered and rejected some of Judge Meis-
burg's specific proposals. As one who is on record as
advocating the submission of all evidence, favorable and
unfavorable alike,33 I concur that the bottom line must
always be the truth-seeking function. Where a represen-
tative or claimant purposely seeks to thwart that func-
tion, I would be the last person to object to the use of
the mechanisms, both civil and criminal, that are already
in place to address such misconduct, including the
Fraud and Abuse provisions of the Social Security Inde-
pendence and Program Improvements Act of 1994.34
Make the Office of Hearings and Appeals (OHA) an
independent agency of the iederal government.
Hear, hear! I don't know whether such a change will
save or cost the government money in the long run;
there are simply too many variables. But surely Judge
Meisburg is correct that having ALJs employed by the
agency for which they are deciding cases, and which
must necessarily be concerned with how many claims
are paid, creates an inherent conflict of interest.
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of Judge Meis-
burg's article is the final portrait he paints of a disability
recipient. He writes:
But, it is a "no brainer" that if a person "gives LIp"
and sits at home, watching TV, gaining weight,
smoking 60 cigarettes per day, drinking a case of
beer every clay, smoking marijuana and using oth-
er illegal drugs, he or she is likely to get worse
rather than better and may always be disabled and
a ward of the state.
Yes, if this is really a typical recipient of benefits,
then something is drastically wrong with our policies.
But if, as I believe after having sat with, interviewed,
evaluated, and represented disabled human beings for
over two decades, this is a hideous caricature, then the
fault lies elsewhere.
Judge Meisburg ends by citing the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act and the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA). 3 5 Surely the ADA is a great step forward for
disabled persons; and, as an advocate, I would far pre-
fer to represent persons with disabilities seeking, or
seeking to maintain, employment, than seeking SSDIB
or SSI. The good news is that the Supreme Court has re-
cently given the AI)A a construction that allows it to
work in tandem with the Social Security Act. In Cleve-
land v. Policy Aanagement Systems JIc.,36 the Court
unanimously ruled that application for, or receipt of, So-
cial Security benefits will not automatically bar an indi-
vidual with disabilities from pursuing an employment
discrimination claim under the ADA. The bad news is
that the Court subsequently decided three cases at the
end of the last term, reading the employment discrimi-
nation provisions of the ADA very narrowly. 3
7
If we are to have sound policies which encourage
people to overcome their disabilities and maintain em-
ployment, a good first step would be for Congress to re-
visit the ADA and amend it so that courts view disabled
people as employers do in the real world. This neces-
sary re-examination of disability policy under the ADA,
and ongoing reassessment of Social Security policies,
will best be served by treating Americans with disabili-
ties fairly, recognizing that they, like the rest of us, are
affected by economic forces, and, most importantly, by
refraining from stigmatizing or demonizing this portion
of our population. TFL
Robert E. Rains is a professor of law at The Dickinson
School of Law of The Pennsylvania State University
where be founded and supemises the
Disability Law Clinic. le greatfully
acknowledges the assistance of Nan-
cy G. Shor and Ethel Zelenske of the
National Organization of Social Se-
curity Claimants' Representatives
(NOSSCR) in preparing this article.
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although employer denied employment based on appli-
cants' conditions without mitigating devices (eyeglasses),
Court deems them not disabled because of their condi-
tions tvitb mitigating devices. Muiphy v. United Parcel
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